Life – Death – Secret – Terrorism by Istvan, Kiraly V.
Life – Death – Secret – Terrorism 
 
István KIRÁLY V.  
Faculty of History and Philosophy, 
Department of Philosophy, 
 “Babeş-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca 
 
Keywords: terrorism, death, denial of death, secret, oath 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to show that terrorism is such a usage of death 
which essentially is inseparable from the secret. We could describe 
terrorism as the breeding ground of terror and anxiety turned into an 
instrument and evoked by death-causing, respectively by death-causing 
presented as constantly possible – that is: threatening – in its secret 
unidentifiability. For the power of terror consists exactly in the quite 
particular instrumentalization of death, as well as of man’s attitude 
towards death – especially the instrumentalization of the fear of death. 
One basic and essential characteristics and aspect of this 
instrumentalization is the secret. It is exactly the secret that organizes, 
articulates, wraps and brings to reality terrorists as individuals, terrorist 
organizations, their activity, aims, instruments, members, plans and in 
short all their deeds. In the terrorist act exactly “this” secret blows fatally 
into (and often also blows up in) the public… Therefore the secret is not 
“one” feature or “attribute” of death-causing terrorism, on the contrary, it 
is the atmosphere and the horizon in which terrorism is outlined as the 
mode of existence of the being called “man” – and in which, hence, it 
must be considered. Consequently, the war on terrorism (too) 
should/must widen into a “fight” against the denial of death. A fight 
which should/must be fought (after all) not only and not exclusively and 
mainly on the secret fields, but, on the contrary, in the depth and womb 
of history – which becomes more and more visible in the fractures of 




 Terrorism is the usage of death essentially inseparable from the 
secret. We could very well describe terrorism as the breeding ground of 
terror and anxiety turned into an instrument and evoked by death-
causing, respectively by death-causing presented as constantly possible – 
that is: threatening – in its secret unidentifiability. For the power of terror 
consists exactly in the quite particular instrumentalization of death, as 
well as of man’s attitude towards death – especially the 
instrumentalization of the fear of death. One basic and essential 
characteristics and aspect of this instrumentalization is the secret.  
 Man instrumentalized death in several ways and/but this always 
turns into a basic form, modality by which the living can be dominated. 
The instrumentalization of death, however, works and is effective time 
and time again and exactly amid the denial of death. Therefore because 
of this – respectively only to this extent – it is true that: “The primary 
motivation of terrorists and suicidal bombers is theological and it 
consists of two principia: duty and reward.”1 It consists of the usage of 
death instrumentalized in its denial by means of secrecy… 
 For terrorism cannot be understood without the secret and the 
instrumentalization of death – which presupposes and is conditioned by 
the denial of death! Since it is the secret that organizes, articulates, wraps 
and brings to reality the terrorists as individuals, the terrorist 
organizations, their activity, their aims, instruments, members, plans and 
in short all their deeds. In the terrorist act exactly “this” secret blows 
fatally into (and often also blows up in) the public…2 Because of this it is 
so “difficult” for the public to defend themselves against it. 
 If not in this sense strictly, but essentially this is what Jürgen 
Habermas formulated in his discussion with Giovanna Borradori 
regarding the interpretation of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack.
3
 
For, he said, the so called “war on terrorism” is waged against an actually 
unknown enemy… Jacques Derrida too said in an interview published in 
the same volume, that: “We do not really know what we are speaking 
about when we talk about September 11.”4 
 To this we must only add – in order to make the matter clearer – 
that the enemy of the war on terrorism is “unknown” not only and not 
                                                 
1 Patrick Sookhdeo, Să înţelegem terorismul islamic (Understanding Islamic 
Terrorism) Oradea, Făclia, 2006, p. 136. (Emphasis mine I. K.V.) 
2 Since terrorists “want” to kill as many and as important/well-known people as 
possible and “want” this act to be communicated to as many people as possible in 
the most vivid and effective manner. 
3 See Giovanna Borradori, Filosofia într-un timp al terorii – Dialoguri cu Jürgen 
Habermas şi Jacques Derrida (Philosophy in the Age of Terror – Dialogues with 
Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida), Bucharest–Piteşti, Paralela’45, 2005, p. 
58. 
4 Ibid., p. 135. 
primarily in the sense as something which – either because it has been 
neglected or because it is a novelty – has not been “investigated” yet… 
but in the sense that it is essentially an enemy which organizes himself 
exactly against the possibility of being known, respectively identified. 
Namely, in secret and with the secret. 
 Consequently: some quite special and, at the same time, 
essential relationship must be created and must operate between secret 
and death in terrorism – that is, in the mechanism of this particular usage 
of death – so that this could exist at all and that it could really “operate”. 
Because killing is not “an aim in itself” for a terrorist – in contrast to a 
person running amok –, he expressly uses death and the special weight, 
power and stress of this usage is conferred by the secret connected to it 
constitutively. For the secret is not “one” feature or “attribute” of death-
causing terrorism which its experience and interpretation meets 
somewhere afterwards abandoning and superseding it… on the contrary, 
it is the atmosphere and the horizon in which terrorism is outlined as an 
existentiale – that is, as the mode of existence of the being which is after 
all usually called “man” – and in which, hence, it must be considered. 
 The secret leaves its mark on the organization of terrorism, it 
protects the plans of terrorist actions, their most detailed parts, 
respectively the modes in which they are carried out and the participants 
– and often the culprits too –, respectively/or it has the role to ensure their 
success. Therefore the secret actually produces, keeps in “life”, moreover 
strengthens – with its invisibility, unidentifiability etc. – the terror of 
(death)threat too. 
 Thus terrorism and terrorists existing-operating in secret and by 
means of the secret cause, deal out death. The difference between a 
terrorits and a conspirator – who otherwise also exists in secret and by 
means of the secret – is, that, on the one hand, conspirators’ targets and 
victims are always determined persons and their positions and that, on the 
other hand, the conspiracy is usually aimed directly against (existent) 
power, against it, but its aim is to seize power expressly and directly.
5
 In 
contrast to this, the terrorists’ targets are usually innocent people who are 
                                                 
5 For further commentaries on conspiracy see our study entitled Az összeesküvés – 
Titok  eskü (Conspiracy – Secret Oath), in: István Király V., Határ – Hallgatás – 
Titok (Boundary – Silence – Secret), Kolozsvár, KOMP-PRESS, Korunk Baráti 
Társaság, 1996, pp. 167–195. and Chapter VI of our book entitled Fenomenologia 
existenţială a secretului – Încercare de filosofie aplicată (The Existentialist 
Phenomenology of the Secret – Essay of Applied Philosophy), Bucharest– Piteşti, 
Editura Paralela ’45, 2001, pp. 229–247. 
in no direct contact with the actual decision making mechanisms.
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Consequently, the terrorist act cannot have for an aim and direct result 
the “taking over” or obtaining of power. 
 The relationship between the secret and terrorism is therefore sui 
generis and furthermore extremely ramified. Such a short analysis can 
naturally outline only some decisive aspects in order to attract the 
attention of future researchers. Since we have to examine and possibly 
answer some essential aspects of the question: how is terrorism possible 
existentially – that is as actually as a mode of existence! – ? Namely: 
how is it possible that well-determined, but in most cases unidentifiable 
people murder other undetermined, but identifiable people in 
systematically outlined and surprisingly successful-effective – often self-
destructive – acts? 
 For it is a big question whether it is really enough to mention 
religious, nationalistic or political fanaticism in order to sketch and 
“understand” such a thing. And, if it would seem to be “enough” the 
mentioning of all these, we could not disregard that if it were not for the 
secret, all these fanaticisms would not in fact succeed or erupt as 




                                                 
6 The victims’ only crime is that by paying their taxes, by their votes, ideas and 
views on the world in some way, nevertheless, support the power “inimical” from 
the terrorists’ point of view. One has to provoke such reactions by means of terror 
that these people – using the same tools (namely votes etc.) – might influence the 
decision-making bodies and processes in the directions wished for by the 
terrorists. 
7 Nevertheless, the question, in what degree the secret, secrecy of terrorism or the 
sui generis relationship between terrorism and the secret is however connected 
with national or/and different religious fundamentalisms, respectively, in other 
aspects, with the psychological particularities-pathology of terrorist persons and 
terrorism and with their study cannot constitute the theme of this investigation if 
only because the lengthiness of such a discussion. After all, countless erudite 
studies have been and are written on these subjects, while this constitutive 
relationship between terrorism and the secret is scarcely raised with thorough 
theoretical exactingness. Consequently, the secret does not even figure in an 
otherwise high quality synthesis dedicated to “the psychology of terrorism”, 
which even presents the statistics of the most frequent criteria used in the 
definitions of terrorism [Cristian Delcea: Psihologia terorismului – Studiu 
psihologic asupra teroriştilor (The Psychology of Terrorism – Psychological 
Study on Terrorists), Cluj-Napoca, Editura Albastră, 2004, p. 18.] Nevertheless, 
the question is formulated whether the psychological theory of terrorism can 
 Like terrorism, in fact the secret is also a mode of existence, 
moreover, a quite complicated and little understood mode of existence. 
Namely, the secret is primarily secreting, respectively the existentiality 
of the co-original and derivate, respectively generated structures related 
to secreting. Therefore the secret is in fact a secured, respectively 
restricted disguising – according to a former analysis and outlining of 
the phenomenon of the secret we made. This exposure, as such, is 
constructed expressly against its own discovery, revealing. We do not 
know the secret (secrets) because it is disguised – and in a restricted, 
secured way disguised –, and this means that everything which is a secret 
is necessarily constructed by erecting actual obstacles, barriers, blockages 
– from invisibility through appearances to all kinds of interdictions – in 
an openly planned and projected way against its discovery and 
“unauthorized” acquisition. 
 By means of the secured disguise the secret’s existentiale, mode 
of existence is organized consequently and in fact against the public in 
general. Of course, taking into consideration exactly the public – or a 
determined part of this –, and exactly as the – restricted or general, but 
special – authority, disposal, power and domination over this. And this 
authority, disposal, power, domination over the public is characterized by 
the fact that it operates by the – theoretical – exclusion of the public, and 
expressly in this exclusion itself. This naturally confers to the secret a 
particular power, efficiency and success as well, both on a factual – 
purposefully in what regards the fruitfulness of the secret – and a 
symbolic level. 
 For symbolically, the secret is exactly in the public. 
Nevertheless, it is obviously there as a secret. And the symbolic power of 
the secret consists of the fact that it can use that against which it was 
created and against which in fact exists – sometimes even making this its 
accomplice – being present as a secret. This meaning that it can use the 
                                                                                                    
scientifically explain how and why “terrorists are born” (Ibid., p. 26.). Of course 
the result of the serious analysis is, however, that: “It seems that psychologists 
agree in the fact that there is no specific psychological attribute which could 
describe terrorists or any other ‘personality’ which is destructive – could be used 
for destruction (the comment is mine – I. K. V.) – for terrorists” (Ibid., p. 108.). It 
is important to clarify all these things lest we should believe that there could be 
no fanatical (ideological or national) terrorism – leading even to suicidal attacks – 
in Christianity for example. The Irish and Basque terrorists, the events of the 
recent Yugoslavian wars which did not always lack religious aspects, can offer 
sufficient warning in this respect (too).   
public symbolically as well. First of all, it “informs” the public of its 
existence – as a secret and exclusively as a secured secret.8 The public is 
informed that there is e.g. inquisitional court, secret political police, that 
there are secret – even terrorist – organizations etc. Meanwhile these exist 
in fact in secret, which means that the public can never openly know 
what, how and when they are going to do. Therefore, it is a defining, 
essential and organic aspect of terrorism that it is, on the one hand, a 
secret violence, on the other hand a death-causing violence striking into 
the public, which, by means of its determined acts and beyond these as 
well, as a permanently caused and maintained terrorization, fear and 
dread, means, signals and threatens with – a secret, therefore inscrutable 
and unidentifiable – public danger.9 
 The secret always requires one or more secret makers, who 
create and operate it, and who meanwhile necessarily keep it – in secret. 
They are therefore the owners of the secret and of its power – as well as 
of its weight and pressure. They are those who by means of the secret are 
and through whom the secret is: powerful. 
 This raises the unavoidable question: How far does the power of 
the secret reach? Has this power any limits, and, if it has, what kind of 
limits are they? Are they only pragmatic or categorial limits instead? 
These questions can be answered only if we make a digression starting 
with an idea we formulated above. 
  The secret, in order to be operational, must be necessarily kept 
as a secret, and its preservation be – continuously – ensured. For this 
reason the communication referring to the secret is peculiar. Since the 
secret – in every respect and direction, at least self-evidently, respectively 
primarily – can be communicated, acquired as a secret and in secret. 
That is, in the case it is – effectively or symbolically – diffused. 
 This means first of all that the secret can be communicated, 
diffused as a secret only if its future preservation is previously 
guaranteed. This – and the primary (mainly ritual etc.) aspects which 
                                                 
8 Let us remember that in many respects – among other things – this was/is the 
source of the terrifying-attracting power of the Inquisition, secret political polices, 
secret societies – e.g. freemasonry – etc., and of the terrorist organizations as 
well. 
9 See also Cristian Delcea, op. cit., p. 17. 
surround it – is what we call in fact initiation.10 Secondly, the initiation 
must offer previous guarantees first of all against betrayal. 
 We can only really understand betrayal if we perceive it not as 
the revealing of the secret, but exactly as the communication of the 
secret in (the) secret as well. For betrayal is in fact the (secondary-
derivate) communication, transmission – in secret – of some secret-
contents belonging to determined secret-structures to other, opposite 
secret-structures.
11
 Consequently and in brief: any secret can be betrayed, 
surpassed in secret without being ever expressly disclosed. (To disclose 
or to break a secret are essentially different from this, since these acts 
bring the secret and its contents to the public sphere, and thus destroy its 
existence. A secret disclosed, made public is no longer a secret!) 
  Regarding its existential structure the secret is a danger to 
itself, being able to consume itself. And exactly against this must/should 
the initiation – which means the primary communication of the secret as a 
secret – offer guarantees. For this reason contains each initiation ritual a – 
compulsory – promise which obliges the initiated to the keep the secret in 
every respect, namely: an oath. 
 The oath required, obtained and taken during the initiation is 
naturally a secret oath,
12
 in which the oath taker obligatorily and 
previously swears to keep – first of all to conceal and be silent about – 
the secret in the future.
13
 The oath is an assurance and security measure 
first of all as the guarantee for a commitment securing the secret against 
betrayal, which is a threat – a threatening possibility – opening in and 
from the secret itself. 
                                                 
10 Regarding more details on initiation see our study entitled Beavatás, hallgatás, 
álarc (Initiation, Silence, Mask) in our volume entitled Határ – Hallgatás – Titok, 
op. cit., pp. 134–153. 
11 This characterizes, by this can be understood, for example, the existential 
structure of spying. 
12 On oath and secret oath see a more detailed discussion in our study entitled Az 
összesküvés – Titok és eskü (Conspiracy – Secret and Oath). Ibid. 
13 The oath gives special weight, stress and basis to the human acts it 
accompanies, since its inner tension, impetus and dynamism takes the oath taker 
beyond the direct, respectively incidental meaning of his acts. Because of this the 
future has a particular emphasis in the temporality of the oath. The future of the 
oath is always anticipatory. And “to anticipate” means: to take before, to act in 
advance. This means going forward in “time” and taking, assuming the results, 
consequences of present actions. See also Rudolf Hirzel, Der Eid – Ein Beitrag zu 
seiner Geschichte, Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1902, pp. 152–171.  
 The secret oath is the step, the existential gesture, ontological 
bridge and mechanism through which the transition from the “profane” 
sphere to the initiated, from the public sphere to the secret takes place. Its 
secrecy, firstly, completes the oath as an act of public validity extending 
it to the limit, secondly, it also means the actual surpassing of this 
(public) validity towards a “sphere” – the secret – in which the public 
regulators are only incidentally, functionally and instrumentally “valid”. 
Therefore in the secret not only any secret “becomes” surpassable – in 
betrayal, respectively in its inner and categorial-structural possibilities, 
which are born in spite of any initiation-like prohibition – , but first of all 
any public regulation and/or regulator as well. Consequently, by means of 
initiation there is a way not only to the material contents of the secret, but 
also to the acquisition of that entirely inner power, which carries the 
secret over the validity of any regulator (norm, value, content and 
prohibition) from an existential, theoretical and ontological point of view. 
Therefore in secret and by means of secret actually any – secret or public 
– regulation, norm, value and/or prohibition can be surpassed.14 
 But this also means that decisive aspect that the secret in itself – 
first of all as a technique and instrument, but basically with respect to its 
categorial structure – is not enough guarantee to assure, enforce its 
preservation, operation etc. 
 Despite this – and exactly as a result of this – a new Being-here, 
a new “subject”, a new secret maker – a new “man” – is born in the 
initiation. Namely, the initiation is at the same time a re-personalization 
which, through and besides establishing a relationship with and 
committing oneself to the secret, means and provides an overview on and 
the acquiring of the categorial power of the secret itself, therefore an 
existential inclusion in it. And this inclusion in the secret has 
repercussion to the entire existence and the entire – new – ontological 
identity of the initiated person. This re-personalized new identity thus 
essentially originates from the secret and is outlined and divided by 
means of the secret.
15
 Its force and consistency therefore originate from 
                                                 
14 This is why jurisprudence and legislation cannot handle the secret. Referring to 
this see also: Michel Coüetoux; Fortuné di Ruzza; Jérôme Dumoulin; Jean-
Jacques Gleizal: La justice face aux fonctions sociales du secret, Grenoble, 
Ministere de la Justice, Service de Coordination de la Recherche, I.R.E.P. – 
Université des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble, 1981, p. 207. 
15 For this reason the so called “psychological” aspects of this, though “real” in 
each case, essentially can only be derivate, therefore secondary. This means that 
the power of the secret, and from its promise, obligation and ability to 
meet the requirements and imperatives of this power. 
 In spite of this – as we have seen – the secret is not enough 
guarantee to assure, enforce its preservation, operation etc. For this 
reason in the initiation – in particular in the oath connected to it –, which 
is the guarantee of the keeping and safe operation of the secret, the 
horizon of this safety, respectively the actual limit of this horizon can 
only be the limit of the being – the initiated himself – who has been 
included thus in the secret. And this limit is – and can be – none other 
than death, the being’s death.16 
 Thus the initiatory oath takes away from death its certain, but 
undetermined when – and in most cases even its how as well17 –, 
outlining, concretizing death – on the one hand – expressly in relation to 
the betrayal of the secret: “...when I reveal the secret, respectively, when 
I break my oath connected to it... may I die or be killed so and so!” 
Usually at the moment when the initiation-swearing act connected to the 
secret goes astray, proves to be faithless according to himself, his 
promises. Which means: though the initiatory oath explicitly specifies the 
how and the when of death, it presents life – the oath taker’s life – as 
something non-whole, therefore non-real originating from his 
faithlessness. In terrorism and the initiation connected with it, however, – 
on the other hand – death is pictured as a fulfilment, the carrying out to 
death of the mission taken on with an oath, and exactly with the goal to 
redeem the life of “others”. 
 Anyway: the person who takes a – necessarily secret – oath to 
keep and operate the secret offers/can offer as an actual guarantee of his 
                                                                                                    
the – quite trendy – observations and studies on the “psychology of terrorists or 
terrorism” are also mainly such.  
16 Similarly, the public oath – which nowadays tends to lose its importance – as 
well is an act which validates the oath taker’s life and aims at its actuality. The 
relational situation of this act – with regard to the possibility of perjury –, by 
anticipating the possibility of degradation, refers to the entirety of the oath 
taker’s life. But it does not present this life as a whole to be looked at from the 
perspective of the end – which means, in its referentiality to death, expressly 
thematizing death. 
17 For this reason figures death necessarily – and not as an emphasis originating 
from elsewhere – in the curse clause of secret oaths as well. In the majority of 
such curse clauses death is concretely mentioned: in case he would break his oath 
the oath taker calls death upon his head, moreover he tells the mode of the death 
as well, “may I be quartered”, “may I be killed with the dagger on which I swear” 
etc. In more detail see: Az összesküvés – Titok és eskü, ibid., pp. 184–185. 
faithfulness only the interruptible non-whole of his own life. This is, of 
course, as we have mentioned, true to terrorism as well. 
 For this reason the possibilities of the secret’s success are two-
fold. The first is the alternative of the “either-or”: the successful mastery 
of either death or life – surpassing death and its threat referring to the 
secret, the secret maker (surviving the threat). This is victory “over 
death”, over the explicitly formulated death threat and the dominion over 
life. This “either-or”, however, is not an alternative which opens “on the 
way” and becomes more and more clearly outlined as one is getting 
nearer to the goal, but it stand at the end of the road from the beginning, 
from the moment one is included in the secret. The second alternative is 
also success over life, but one which leads through death-causing; a – 
from every point of view deathly – success which (suicidally) denies 
death (at least) with reference to the secret and the secret maker (too). By 
this the initiation-like secret vow presents the oath not only in its – truly 
universal, therefore exceeding the authority of any public and secret 
regulator – legislative quality, as a source of rights, but also as something 
from which the “rights” of disposing over life and death originate from. 
Consequently, the omnipotence of the secret manifests itself in the 
initiatory indrawal, insight and commitment to the categorial power of 
the secret. 
 With this, however, we have got a general outline of the ground 
on which we can to some measure answer the questions we asked above: 
How far does the power of the secret reach? Has this power any limits, 
and, if it has, what kind of limits are they? Has the secret – existentially –
only pragmatic or categorial limits instead? 
 The analyses we have made afore clearly suggest that 
existentially the limits of the secret are primarily not categorial, but 
pragmatic. That is, they consist of the mode its usage – dedication and 
determinedness, awareness related to it, respectively “expertise” in it. 
This does not mean that the secret has no categorial limits (as well). For 
we have just seen this related to betrayal. Obviously, all this can be 
applied and utilized in the contemporary fight against terrorism, for it is 
obvious that we can fight – openly, “directly” and to some measure 
effectively – against the secret of terrorism only with the rather 
polysemous and many-edged instrument of the secret. 
 Meanwhile, we should know about this present terrorism, 
considered a global threat, that historically speaking, and in the majority 
of its essential aspects – therefore with respect to the secret as well! –, it 
is the rather direct result and consequence of the Cold War, respectively 
to its (apparent) outcome. As its name reveals, the Cold War was a non-
military contest and clash between two – otherwise incompatible – social 
systems, its permanent and real goal being after all and all the time the 
annihilation of the rival. For this reason the secret had a peculiar place 
and role in it, since the “warfare” of the Cold War did not meant the use 
of brute military force, but an extensive and oppressive rivalry extended 
to back countries and allies.
18
 In this warfare socialism for example – for 
the first time in history – really centralized and totalized the secret and 
the category of secrets.
19
 But the hottest front of the Cold War was the 
Third World. 
 Present day terrorism – identified as a global threat – (too) 
sprouted in the secret fields of the Cold War, in the different countries 
where – in secret! – individuals explicitly called and acting like terrorists 
(even) now were trained, and where organizations were initiated or 
supported.
20
 For this reason present day terrorism primarily is not 
“international” in the sense that its organizations operate in unison in 
several countries, but rather in the fact that – meanwhile – they bring 
together and profit by the competencies of several national secret 
services. 
                                                 
18 On the relationship of the Cold War and the secret see in more detail our study 
entitled Library Secret Fonds and the Competition of Societies in the volume 
Books, Libraries, Reading, and Publishing in the Cold War, Hermina G. B. 
Anghelescu and Martine Poulain (eds.), Washington, D. C., Library of Congress, 
The Centre for the Book, 2001, pp. 185–192. 
19 On the relationship of socialism and the secret see our study entitled Titok és 
szocializmus in our volume Filozófia és Itt-Lét, Kolozsvár, Erdélyi Híradó, 1999, 
pp. 57–78. 
20 Let us consider how the secret polices of several communist countries trained 
or supported terrorists such as Carlos or Jasser Arafat and his organization etc., 
respectively that the present day number one public enemy, Osama bin Laden, 
was trained and helped to create his first organization by the CIA. This 
organization was later joined by “specialists” taught and trained by the KGB and 
the Mossad etc., so that there the trainees could exchange their experiences and 
learning. In these movements, nowadays identified as “terrorist movements”, 
therefore competencies connected to the secret, which otherwise – actually – 
nowhere and in no circumstances could be united, are gathered and “impregnate” 
one another in the secret. Since the official, “public” national information services 
– defending themselves, and functioning against one another – “can 
communicate” only well-determined information, and not “techniques” and 
structures to one another.  
 However, present day terrorism is not simply the “consequence” 
of the Cold War, but at the same time the way in which this grasps the 
secret sui generis for itself: seeing and showing it omnipotent, as the 
master of life and death. 
 The terrorism and the terrorist existing-operating in secret and 
by the secret therefore cause and deal out death, while the terrorist 
himself often dies. He commits suicide or is killed. But DOES the suicide 
or liquidated terrorist really DIE? And DO the victims “punished” by 
terrorism really DIE? Or do they rather DEPART? The Islam terrorist 
departs to his heavens – to others’ hell –, and his victims too – depending 
on the point of view – move to their heavens, respectively others’ hell. 
Actually none DIES really; losing their lives, they pass instead to a – 
never indifferent, either salutary or damned, but nevertheless – eternal 
life. 
 At any rate, terrorism (too) – as the actuality of the dominion 
over life and death – can hardly be imagined without the 
instrumentalizing denial of death and dying. The instrumentalizing denial 
of death, dying in terrorism happens mainly and mostly, as we have 
mentioned above, by means of the radicalization of very traditional 
cultural – usually, but not always religious – bases and premises. On the 
basis therefore, that the denial of death has become a fundamental 
historical characteristic of “culture” refined to a “function”. Secondly, 
however, by the fact that – amid the specific instrumentalization of death 
– terrorism wishes to give some special, determined sense to dying, 
especially to the terrorist’s (own) possible or actual dying.21 A sense by 
which this – also as a possible or actual dying – will become exemplary 
and memorable at the same time. That is, it “outlives” the dying person –
who can and wants to “survive” not through his life, but instead through 
his dying – expressly and directly as dying. Because of this reason, this is 
in fact the denial of death. For this dying is not really heroic, – even if we 
speak about profane, atheistic (“god-less”) terrorism – only sacrificial. As 
                                                 
21 This of course does not mean that death and dying could not be “given” some 
determined sense at all. For this happens for example in every heroic death as 
well. But we should understand that, basically, on the one hand, every sense in 
human life originates – non-thematically – from death, respectively mortality (for 
without this the importance of senses would be meaningless!), and that, on the 
other hand, by such things the circle of “meaningful” deaths, and of those which 
should be considered as such is unauthorizedly and artificially constricted. For 
people die from different causes and in different ways day by day, but – 
fortunately – there is not given cause and occasion for heroic death day by day... 
far as the assailant is the sacrificer – the one who sacrifices others –, but 
he is also the self-sacrificial, sacrificing himself. He differs from his 
victim in this respect. The weight of his sacrifice, self-sacrifice is 
essentially and exactly in the actual and factual denial of death, (his) 
dying, namely the existential facticity, the definiteness of this denial – 
as denial. In other words, in the negativity of the denial, in the active and 
articulated actuality of this negativity (in the “positivity” of death-
causing). Terrorism instrumentalizes, uses and dominates death in these 
occasions by means of this denying actuality. 
 The terrorist’s “death” is therefore such – respectively that– life-
losing which – according to him and for him! – directly and expressly 
ensures his existence beyond life, in other words the non-death, the non-
dying, the non-passing. His victims’ death, the interpretation and 
interpretedness of this – beyond the fact that they are directly the victims 
of the terrorist act –, on the other hand are committed to the rolling and 
expanding waves of terror caused, surrounded and magnified by the 
effective contribution of the secret. Which means, that death and dying 
are instrumentalized – by means of the secret which got to dominate the 
disposal over life and death – on the grounds of the denial of death, and 
thread by the denial of death.  
 Psychologists, anthropologists, etc. experience and interpret the 
denial of death as a “basic human need”,22 as a defence against death – 
mainly against its pressure and the anxiety caused by its actuality 
(mortality salience) –, by which people try to manage the terror caused by 
the threat of death, in other words, the terror of that with which they are 
confronted by (their) experiences, moreover, referring exactly to them. 
This then creates and starts a series of narrow or far-reaching defensive 
and declining mechanisms. One of the most essential among these is the 
                                                 
22 This is a very dynamic and ramifying – anthropological, psychological, 
sociological etc. – field of study launched and fertilized mainly by Ernest 
Becker’s successful book entitled The Denial of Death, published in 1973. See 
also Daniel Liechty, “Reaction to Mortality: An Interdisciplinary Organizing 
Principle for the Human Sciences”, Zygon, 1998/1, pp. 45–58.; Camilla 
Zimmerman–Gary Rodin, “The Denial of Death Thesis: Sociological Critique and 
Implications for Palliative Care”, Palliative Medicine, 2004/18, pp. 121–128.; 
Joseph Bottum, “Death and Politics”, First Things, June/July 2007, pp. 17–29. 
Enikő Školka’s soon to be published study entitled Approaches of the Terror 
Management and Self-Determination Theories on Defense Mechanism against 
Death is a superb synthesis of the psychological aspects and literature of the 
theme.    
belief and idea of immortality, which, however, is confronted with actual, 
factic death time and time again. 
 In this way death is turned into something which is life-loss, but 
not dying, while dying becomes something which now uncomprehended 
and unmanaged terrorizes. Therefore it must be denied again and again. 
 But we can see, in a denied death not only death, but life too 
loses from its weight. For life becomes something, the loss of which – in 
Kierkagaard’s words – in fact is not deathly! Or, as Nietzsche said in 
another respect: man has lost far more essential things in his life, than 
life... 
 Of course, accidentally the question might occur whether 
confronting death is not man’s basic need in the same measure as its 
denial. A basic need which is moreover, again and again, suppressed and 
deformed by the denial of death! 
 Therefore, coming back to the issue of “sense”, “giving” a 
determined instrumentalizing sense to death means, in fact, to outline the 
denial of death – instrumentalized – amid this same denial. For this 
sense of death – always attempting to define it – in most cases is/gets not 
only beyond dying, but also beyond life itself. In these cases, it seems 
that not human life is that which, being mortal and exactly because it is 
mortal, permanently surpasses itself, but only the losing of life – recte: 
death – carries, can carry it “beyond” one’s own dying. 
     One may suppose therefore that people would at least more 
seldom blow – and generally kill – one another and themselves up if they 
understood that their single life is finite, in other words: uncontinuable 
and unrepeatable as well; if they did not deny death, their death. 
 In fact, the war on terrorism (too) should/must widen into a 
“fight” against the denial of death. A fight which should/must be fought 
(after all) not only and not exclusively and mainly on the secret fields, 
but, on the contrary, in the depth and womb of history – which becomes 
more and more visible in the fractures of history by means of present day 
terrorism. Therefore, we should speak of far more and of far more 
essential things than the fact that, consequently to and amid the 
developments of terrorism, which has reached new dimensions since 
September 11, 2001, we ought to re-evaluate critically (once again) – and 
for the sake of a new “cosmopolitan” world order (Habermas) – the legal, 
international legal and political institutions and ideas of the 
Enlightenment and of the age based on this.
23
 Though, naturally, this 
latter issue might be of interest as well, moreover, seemingly it is more 
direct and accessible. But it is probably not enough. 
 In the “age of terror” philosophy could first of all offer a view 
on this to us, living people – though it cannot constrain us to look at it.   
   
                                                 
23 As Habermas and Derrida suggested this in their colloquies with Giovanna 
Borradori. See: Giovanna Borradori, op. cit. 
